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stated that "such a practice if inaugurated would end only in confusion, delay and injustice .... ,,32 The fact that few executors
have demanded such a trial in the past may be attributable to the
earlier authorities which strongly indicate that the courts, the bar,
and legal scholars believed that there was no such right to a trial
by jury in an accounting proceeding in the surrogate's courts. The
decision in Garfield is sure to substantially increase such demands.
The New York Court of Appeals has rectified a long standing
misconception as to the executor's right to a trial by jury in an
accounting proceeding. The decision is strongly supported by the
history of the development of the surrogate's courts' powers, since
such claims at common law were triable at law where a jury was
available. The expansion of surrogate court jurisdiction should not
eliminate the right to have a jury trial in these cases. Although
the decision in the principal case may cause some confusion and
consternation in the surrogate's courts, the right to a trial by
a jury of peers is a fundamental constitutional right and this
decision is a reaffirmation thereof.
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tioner, a distributor of paper products, had for a number of years
entered into collective bargaining agreements with respondent union.
The most recent agreement expired; and when the parties were
unable to agree on a new contract the union filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board alleging a refusal to bargain.
These charges were subsequently determined by the Board to be
without foundation; however, the union continued to picket. The
Regional Director sought an injunction under Section 10(1)' of the
National Labor Relations Act alleging that the acts of the union
constituted recognitional picketing in violation of section 8(b) (7)
32

Matter of Woodward, supra note 22, at 449, 173 N.Y. Supp. at 558.

'Section 10(l) of the act reads in part: "Whenever it is charged that
any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
. . . section 158(b) (7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such
charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except
cases of like character. . . . Upon the filing of . . . [a] petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . ." Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704(d), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
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(C) 2 of the act. The District Court held that the acts of the
union constituted recognitional picketing, but refused to find that it
was "just and proper" 3 to grant injunctive relief. Penello v. Warehouse Employees Local 570, 230 F. Supp. 900 (D. Md. 1964).'
At common law when an employer chose to recognize a
union as bargaining agent of his employees, he might do so regardless of the union's representative status.5 This common-law
rule was changed initially by the Wagner Act 6 and later by the
Taft-Hartley Act.7 These acts compelled an employer to recognize
a union when it achieved a representative status. Many unions
sought to achieve this status by engaging in recognitional picketing.
Such picketing has been defined as the application of economic
pressure on an employer to cause him to recognize a union as the
bargaining agent of his employees."
Before the enactment of the 1959 amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, federal statutes dealt only with a very limited
aspect of the problem of recognitional picketing. Section 8(b) (4)
(C)' of the act prohibited picketing, the object of which was to
force an employer to recognize a union, where the employees were
already represented by another union which had been certified by
the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining

agent of those employees. The Board further undertook to regulate

2 Section 8(b) of the act reads in part:
"It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents-...
(7) to picket . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as
the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees
to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining
representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the

representative of such employees: ...

(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing." LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§ 704(c), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (Supp. IV, 1963).
3 Natinal Labor Relations Act § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (Supp. IV,
1963).
4This case is actually the rehearing of an action concerning the same
parties, 230 F. Supp. 892 (1964), which was dismissed because of the Board's
erroneous view of the law. In that case, the court objected to the Board's
determination that the respondent's right to picket changed when the employer

section 159(c) of this title being filed within a reasonable period of time

withdrew his recognition of the union. The petition was there dismissed
without prejudice to bring the present action upon proper conclusions of law.
6a1 CCI LaB. L. REP. f"1410.
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
7Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
s Showe, Federal Regulation of Recognitional Picketing, 52 Go. L.J. 248

(1964).

o61 Stat 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(C)

IV, 1963).

(Supp.
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recognitional picketing beyond the limited scope of section 8(b) (4)
(C) by invoking section 8(b) (1) (A),10 which made it an unfair
labor practice for a union to coerce or restrain non-union employees
in the exercise of their rights not to engage in collective bargaining
and other forms of union activity.1'
Until the 1959 amendments, therefore, the act did not expressly prohibit a union from picketing to compel an employer to
recognize it as the bargaining agent of hik employees except in the
limited cases controlled by section 8(b) (4) (C). As a result, a
union which represented only a minority of the employees, or none
at all, could freely engage in recognitional picketing, or, as it was
sometimes called, "blackmail picketing."
Congress in enacting the 1959 amendments sought to provide
a more fundamental basis for the regulation of this type of picketing.
As a result of congressional deliberation, section 8(b) (7) (C)' 2 was
enacted into law. This section prohibits recognitional picketing
where such has been continued for more than a reasonable period of
time, not to exceed thirty days, and where no petition for an
election has been filed.
There is no doubt that the primary congressional intent was
to outlaw "blackmail picketing," but it is equally true that the clear
language of the statute goes beyond the mere prohibition of that
practice.'1 The only labor organization exempted from the statute's
application is one that is "currently certified." 14 In addition, the
legislative history of the act shows an intentional acceptance of the
House-sponsored requirement that exemption only accrue to unions
currently certified, and an equally intentional abandonment of the
Senate-sponsored provision which would have exempted all unions
having majority status, even though they were not certified.' 5 This
Senate proposal, if enacted, could possibly have immunized picketing
similar to that in the instant case from the statute's application.
In Dayton Typographical Local 57 v. ALRB,'0 the court
indicated that the clear language of section 8(b) (7) goes beyond
1061 Stat. 141 (1947),

29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958).
11 Showe, supra note 8, at 248, 249.
12 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (7) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
See Crowley, The Regulation of Organizational and
Recognitional Picketing Under Section 8(b)(7) of the National Labor Rela-

tions Act, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 295, 296 (1963).
's Penello v. Warehouse Employees Local 570, 230 F. Supp. 892, 897 (D.
Md. 1964) (hereinafter cited as Penello I); Dayton Typographical Local 57
v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
14 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (7) (C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
x6 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2512-13 (1959); H.R. 8400, 86th Cong.
h 705(c) (1959)
II LEGISLATIVE HisToRY OF THF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RPORTING AND DiscLOsuRE Acr OF 1959, at 1700(3) (hereinafter cited as
LPG. HIST) ; S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 708 (1959) ; I LEG. Hisr 583-84;
See Dayton Typographical Local 57 v. NLRB, supra note 13, at 637-38.
16 Dayton Typographical Local 57 v. NLRB, supra note 13.
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the mere correction of "blackmail picketing." The court held that
where a union had not been certified and had not filed a petition
for a representation election, recognitional picketing for more than
thirty days was prohibited, even though the union held authorization
cards signed by a majority of the employees. This case also
indicated that under section 8(b) (7) even peaceful picketing 17would
be prohibited if the other conditions of the section were met.
In the instant case, the union walked out of the negotiations
for a new contract after only two sessions and thereafter began to
picket. The Court pointed out that since the employer, in good
faith, had hired replacements for these picketers, there were reasonable grounds for him to withdraw recognition from the union.18
The opinion concluded that since the picketing, with the added
recognitional objective, had continued for more than thirty days,
there was a violation of section 8(b) (7) (C) which constituted an
unfair labor practice.1 9 Whatever "rights" the former employees
were limited to their ability to
had under the 1959 amendments
20
call for, and vote in, an election.
The respondent did not seriously challenge the fact that it was
partially engaged in recognitional picketing. However, it contended
that since the principal objective of the picketing was of an economic
nature, it was permitted by the act and hence not an unfair labor
practice. 21 Relying on the Dayton case, the Court rejected this
contention, stating that if the obtainment of recognition had in fact
become an object of the picketing, regardless of whether it was
the original object, the provisions of section 8(b) (7) must be
applied.2 2 The Court, therefore, held that the picketing was dearly
recognitional within the meaning of the express statutory language.
The Court, however, was somewhat reluctant to reach this
conclusion. It pointed out that there were powerful policy areaments for allowing the union to picket in such a situation. The
Court stated that because of the neaceful nature of the picketing,
and the possible inequity in compelling the union to call an election
so soon after picketing commenced in order to determine its status,
it would be harsh to apply section 8(b) (7) (C). However, the
Court stated that it had to take the statute as it was written, and
having found the picketing to be recognitional, it concluded that
section 8(b) (7) (C) was properly invoked by the petitioner.
1ld. at 639-40.
18 Penello v. Warehouse Employees Local 570, 230 F. Supp. 900, 902-03
(D. Md. 1964) (hereinafter cited as Penello II).
19 Penello II, supra note 18, at 904-05.
20
National Labor Relations Act § 9(c) (1). 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1) (Supp. IV, 1963). See S. REP. No. 187,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33, 2 U.S. CDE CoNG. & AD. NEWs 2318 (1959).
21 Penello II, supra note 18, at 903.
22
Dayton Typographical Local 57 v. NLRB, supra note 13, at 636;
Penello I, supra note 13, at 898; Penello II,supra note 18, at 904-05.
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The respondent further contended that the provisions of section
8(b) (7) were designed to prohibit picketing seeking to force an
employer's initial acceptance of a union.23 The Court pointed out
that the only decision which the respondent cited in support of its
position was mere dictum. 24 Hence, it was concluded that there was
"no justification in the statute, the legislative history or the cases
interpreting the statute, for limiting section 8(b) (7) to picketing
having as its target forcing or requiring an employer's initial acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of his employees. 25
Despite the holding that the union was engaged in an unfair
labor practice, the Court refused to grant the injunctive relief
prayed for by petitioner under section 10(1). In support of this
holding the Court noted that the picketing was peaceful and that
there was no indication that it obstructed the free flow of commerce.
Furthermore, the employer himself could always call for an election. 26 The Court held that under section 10(1) courts have been
granted discretionary power to refuse to issue an injunction even
when an unfair labor practice has been found to exist. Upon the
facts of the instant case, the Court decided that it would not be
"just and proper" to grant injunctive relief.
In view of the legislative history of section 10(1), it would
seem that once a court has decided that a union has committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b) (7), an injunction
should issue as a matter of right.2 7 Section 10(1) is designed to
give an employer speedy relief by way of injunction when such
relief is deemed by a federal district court to be "just and proper." 28
The statute was amended in 1959 to include
specifically the unfair
29
labor practice of recognitional picketing.
In Compton v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union"0 the
First Circuit stated that where the evidence afforded reasonable
22

Penello II, supra note 18, at 903.

Ibid. Building & Trades Council of Santa Barbara County, (Sullivan
Electric Co.), Case No. 21-CF-107, 146 N.L.R.B. 138 (1964).
24

25 Penello II, supra note 18, at 904.
26Id. at 905. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)

(1958).
27 See Dayton Typographical Local 57 v. NLRB, supra note 13; Phillips
v. United -Mine Workers of America, 217 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Tenn. 1963):
Compton v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union, 184 F. Supp. 210
(D. P.R. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1961); see also interesting
discussion of the statement of minority views in S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 5, 18-19, 41 (1947), and the debates in the House and
Senate, 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 887 (1948); 2 NLRB, LFIsLATIvE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 1109-10, 1180, 1481,
1585

(1948).
28

National- Labor Relations Act § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)

(Supp. IV,

1963).
29 Ibid.
30 Compton v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union, .npra note 27.
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cause for the Regional Director to believe a charge that a labor
union was engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of section
8(b) (7) (C), a temporary injunction should issue pending the final
disposition of the charge.31 Thus, it would appear that in cases
where an unfair labor practice is actually present, an injunction
should a fortiori issue.3 2 However, the Court in Penello held that
the finding of an unfair labor practice did not ipso facto make it
"just and proper" for a court to grant injunctive relief to the
victim of that practice, and that in a proper case, as in the instant
case, it would not be "just and proper" to issue an injunction.
The holding of the Court is open to the criticism that it has
assumed a legislative function and by this means has diluted the
purpose and force of a statute. The legislative history of section
8(b) (7) shows that the statute was enacted to proscribe the evil
of recognitional picketing. Section 10(1) was enacted to provide
an essential remedy for the victim of such an unfair labor practice.
By limiting the remedy provided by section 10(1), the Court in
the instant case may have mitigated the effect that Congress sought
to achieve when it enacted section 8(b) (7).
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PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF LumP-Sum DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE
OF EMPLOYEES' TRUST-In 1945 plaintiff's employer, the Waterman
Steamship Corporation, established a non-contributory retirement
plan for its employees. Ten years later, on May 5, 1955, C. Lee
Company purchased over ninety-nine per cent of the outstanding
stock of Waterman. A newly elected Board of Directors voted to
terminate the plan as of the date of the stock acquisition and pursuant to the Board's resolution, distribution was made on August 1,
1955. Subsequently, Lee merged into Waterman. The Internal
Revenue Code provides for long-term capital gains treatment of
lump-sum distributions of employees' trusts, if such distribution is
on account of the employee's death or other "separation from the
service." 1 Plaintiff brought this suit for recovery of income taxes
on the contention that the change in stock ownership, resulting in the
new management's termination of the plan, was a change of employers tantamount to a "separation from the service." In reversing
31 Ibid.
3
2 Phillips v. United Mine Workers of America, supra note 27; Compton
v. Local 346, Int'l Leather Goods Union AFL-CIO, supra note 27; Alpert
v. Local 271, Int'l Hod Carriers'

Bldg., and Common Laborers' Union of

America,
198 F. Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1961).
1
INT. Rsv. CoDE oF 1954, § 402(a)(2).

